• PowerChina Resources is committed to following World Bank Environmental and Social Safeguards Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014)
• PowerChina Resources is also pursuing a program to achieve certification according to ISO standards for quality (ISO 9001), environmental management system (ISO 14001), and health & safety (OHS 18001) (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Management and Monitoring Plan Draft - May 2011).

• No information collected.

• Not assessed as no company commitment.

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• The draft EMP addressed air quality, noise, vibration and blasting; spoil disposal management; hydrology and sediment management; water quality management; aquatic biodiversity and resource use management, terrestrial biodiversity management; watershed management; salvage logging and biomass removal management; general waste and hazardous materials management; archaeology; climate and energy management; transmission line and construction access roads management (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Management and Monitoring Plan Draft - May 2011).
• The final EMP was not publicly disclosed. For the purposes of this assessment, we were only able to obtain the draft EMP.

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• The draft EIA covers physical impacts (hydrology, erosion and sediment transport, water quality, air quality, noise and vibration, archaeology, general waste and hazardous materials, accidental events and natural hazards, climate and energy), biological impacts (aquatic and terrestrial), social impacts (land use, economic development and employment, fisheries, livelihood and resource use, in-migration, health, nutrition and community safety, vulnerable groups, tourism, transportation, forest resource use impacts, visual amenity), transmission line and construction access roads impacts, and natural resources impacts. It also includes a chapter on village impacts. However, the EIA failed to reflect the cumulative impacts from the cascade (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Impact Assessment Draft – May 2011).
• After visiting over 30 communities and interviewing some 100 villagers in 2012, International Rivers found that communities were not informed or able to access information about the dam’s impacts, resettlement plans or livelihood restoration programs, and consultation with local people was non-existent. In all cases, communication between PowerChina Resources and local authorities was limited to the village chief (Source: Site visit, March 2012).
• The draft EIA referred to the alternatives discussed in the feasibility study report, but did not evaluate these alternatives. These alternatives include alternative cascade design, alternative normal water levels, and alternative location of dam sites (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Impact Assessment Draft - May 2011).
• The final EIA was not publicly disclosed. For the purposes of this assessment, we were only able to obtain the draft EIA (dated May 2011).

• No information collected.

• The draft EMP recommended that a Watershed Management Plan be prepared before construction commences on the Nam Ou cascade project, including the following elements: watershed description, analysis of existing water quality/hydrology and expected impacts of the project, stakeholder consultation, proposed management and mitigation measures. However, this was not completed prior to the start of construction (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Management and Monitoring Plan Draft – May 2011).
• As of October 2013, an IFC initiative with local government authorities commenced to develop a river basin profile of the Nam Ou. No PowerChina Resources representatives were involved (Source: Workshop Report – First Technical Working Group Meeting and Training Workshop on Integrated River Basin Management in Key River Basins in Lao PDR – Luang Prabang, Lao PDR September 30-October 5, 2013).

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• The total footprint of the project will potentially affect approximately 829 ha of vegetation, which includes both forested areas and in-channel vegetation. Large-antlered Muntjac, classified by IUCN as endangered, had been sighted by all the villages. Two threatened plant species that are listed as critically endangered on the IUCN RED List (2010), as well as one listed as endangered, were identified. The construction of Nam Ou 2 is likely to inundate a significant percentage of prawn caves and the prawn fishery is expected to become unviable. There are 25 Mekong endemic fish species recorded in the Nam Ou sub-basin; five with potential endemic status within Nam Ou (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Impact Assessment Draft – May 2011).
• No information collected on species impact mitigation strategies.
• According to a conversation with the site project manager in PowerChina Resources Luang Prabang office, there have not been any measures taken to mitigate biodiversity impacts. He doesn’t expect there will be any measures in the future either (Source: Short Company Interview, Nam Ou Cascade Project Office, Luang Prabang PowerChina Resources Office, 3 March, 2014).

• No information collected.

• The draft EMP includes air quality, noise, vibration and blasting; spoil disposal management; water quality management; and general waste and hazardous materials management (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Management and Monitoring Plan Draft – May 2011).
• No information has been provided on the implementation of the proposed measures contained in the draft EMP.

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• The EMP noted that a Preliminary Report on Physical Cultural Resources Study was conducted prior to project construction, which identified a large number of artifacts within the local villages, four historic caves and one pottery production site. The most significant site identified was Pha Taem, a prehistoric rock painting site. The key recommended measures included undertaking detailed archaeological surveys of all construction areas and further studies of the Pha Taem Rock Painting, and preparing archaeology and cultural heritage preservation work plans. However, no information was collected in terms of the implementation of the recommended measures (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Management and Monitoring Plan Draft – May 2011).
• Temples would be replaced in new villages. During our Site visit, we observed the potential site for the temples in the newly built resettlement villages. Local communities were also told that they would be given new temples in the resettlement sites (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).

• No information collected.

• The EMP recommended that landforms such as roads should be designed to consider the long-term potential use (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Management and Monitoring Plan Draft – May 2011).
• Some erosion and sediment management problems were observed during the site inspection, without evidence of mitigation strategies (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).

• No information collected.

• Minimum environmental flows objectives were recommended in the EIA, but no detailed analysis or assessment on environmental flows and how the minimum flows were set was provided (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Impact Assessment Draft – May 2011).

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• PowerChina Resources has conducted assessment of the livelihoods, living standards and impacts of the project on the local communities’ livelihoods and living standards. There was no evidence of measures undertaken by the company to protect downstream riparian lands and mitigate the livelihood impacts for downstream communities (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Impact Assessment Draft – May 2011; Site visit, February-March 2014).
• There is little or no local employment by PowerChina Resources because the work is deemed too difficult (long hours, difficult physical work conditions) and under remunerated (Xayaburi Dam is a more attractive dam project to work on) (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).
• Villagers felt that the resettlement support was not sufficient and complicated by difficulty in resolving local grievances. Community engagement is concentrated on the highly impacted villages, which is characterized by frequent communication between PowerChina Resources and village leadership (as much as two to three times per week) and in some cases town meetings (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• The Social Impact Assessment covered direct impacts, such as displacement, health impacts, and gender impacts, but failed to cover indirect and cumulative impacts. The assessments only focused on the direct impacts from construction and inundation and did not consider the impacts on the riparian lands and livelihoods of downstream and upstream villages (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Impact Assessment Draft – May 2011; Site visit, February-March 2014).
• Two of the communities to be involuntary relocated due to Nam Ou 2 were able to vote for their desired site (Pak China and Khon Kerng), in other cases, a resettlement site below the dam site was chosen for the village (e.g. Kha Na). Many villagers were discontented and concerned that the resettlement sites located below the dam site were far from their farm land (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).
• The Social Impact Assessments (SIA) were completed, but not made publicly available.

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• According to PowerChina Resources, there were three levels of public consultations before the project started construction (Source: Company meeting • Beijing, December 2014).
• After visiting over 30 communities and interviewing some 100 villagers in 2012, International Rivers found that communities were not informed or able to access information about the dam’s impacts, resettlement plans or livelihood restoration programs, and the consultation with local people was non-existent. In all cases, communication between PowerChina Resources and local authority was limited to the village chief (Source: Site visit, March 2012).
• During International Rivers’ 2014 trip to Nam Ou, frequent communication was evidenced in the highly impacted villages between PowerChina Resources and village leadership (as much as two to three times per week), and in some cases town meetings were held to give information (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).
• According to PowerChina Resources, the company changed resettlement sites several times to respect the local culture and the communities’ opinions (Source: Company meeting, December 2014).

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• According to PowerChina Resources, the company had established a grievance and complaints mechanism. Most of complains are solved in one to two weeks and at the town level. Some difficult problems may need extra time to process (Source: Company meeting, December 2014).
• Villagers around Nam Ou 2 are using a grievance and complaints mechanism as mandated under Lao law. Of the two village-level claims we learned of (Nong Kham and Hat Phang – affected by Nam Ou 2) neither claims were responded to within the period legislated by the company (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• Communities did not report access to a benefit sharing fund as part of the resettlement compensation scheme (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).

• No information collected.

• The on-site living conditions of non-Chinese workers are significantly worse than the Chinese workforce. For the mainly Vietnamese work force, eating and sleeping quarters are very basic (open air accommodation, dirt floors) and could be described as squalid. In contrast, the Chinese workforce we spoke with described their conditions as very or quite good (air-conditioned units, two persons per room, TV, and rest and recreational facilities) (Source: Site visit, Februar- March 2014).
• Local people deemed the work too difficult (long hours, difficult physical work conditions, poor pay) and under remunerated (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).

• No information collected.

• No information collected.

• No information collected.

• There is little or no local employment by PowerChina Resources because the work is deemed too difficult (long hours, difficult physical work conditions, poor pay) and under remunerated (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).
• We observed that most of the non-Chinese labor was from Vietnam (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).
• No information provided on training.

• No information collected.

• No information collected.

• No information collected.

• The EIA report included a study of relevant laws and regulations (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Impact Assessment Draft – May 2011).
• In an interview with a project manager at the Nam Ou Cascade Project Office in Luang Prabang, he reported that there were very few issues because the Lao government supports the investment project (Source: Short Company Interview, Nam Ou Cascade Project Office, Luang Prabang PowerChina Resources Office, 3 March 2014).
• PowerChina Resources hasn’t complied with the Decrees 192 and 112 of Cambodia.

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• There was no evidence provided that the company or the Lao government has engaged with river basin authorities, such as the Mekong Rivers Commission, to assess or inform them of transboundary impacts arising from Nam Ou 2.
• The EIA didn’t evaluate the impacts on sedimentation and fisheries downstream on the Mekong (Source: Cascade 2 Huai Kan Hydropower Project Environmental Impact Assessment Draft – May 2011).

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• No information collected.

• PowerChina Resources has committed to following World Bank Safeguard Policies (Source: Company meeting November 2013, reconfirmed in December 2014).

• Villagers confirmed that a PowerChina Resources team visits the villages often but the contents of the meeting are in relation to resettlement plans. Lao translators translated announcements by the Chinese company representatives, however, no written information was given. Villagers are aware of the potential risk of fish reduction in the river, but are not clear about the impacts on food security, emergency preparedness, a final resettlement plan, compensation, or water level and future livelihood support. Some villagers interviewed were not clear about the project’s progress (Source: Site visit, February-March 2014).